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The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark
Russel Lawrence Barsh*
James Youngblood Henderson**
I. INTRODUCTION: THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK
They sought it with thimbles, they sought it with care;
They pursued it with forks and hope;
They threatened its life with a railway-share;
They charmed it with smiles and soap.
- Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark
The judicial pursuit of principles in Indian law has been a little
like Lewis Carroll's hunting of the snark: an aimless voyage towards
an unknown objective.1 The trail has traced and retraced the same
ground-the same historical documents, facts, and precedents-and
each traverse has resulted in new relations and reversals of direction.
Recently, it has become clear that Indian tribes are gradually, inexor-
ably losing self-governing authority.2 The latest case in this area,
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,3 constitutes a major extension
of this process.
In Oliphant, the Supreme Court reversed a 1976 Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision upholding the power of the Suquamish
Tribe to arrest and try two non-Indians under the Suquamish Tribal
Code for assault, resisting arrest, and reckless driving. Such power
was, the tribe argued and the court of appeals agreed, inherent and
retained, having never been ceded by the Indians or expressly termi-
nated by Congress.' In the absence of specific legislative action, the
court of appeals held, the power claimed by the tribe was assumed
to exist. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist,
held to the contrary: absent an express congressional delegation of
power, tribes may not try non-Indians.
* Associate Professor of Business, Government & Society, University of Washing-
ton School of Business Administration.
** Union of Nova Scotia Indians, Sidney, Nova Scotia.
1. L. CARROLL, The Hunting of the Snark-An Agony in Eight Fits, in Tim
HUNTnG OF THE SNARK 27 (1909).
2. See generally Barsh, The Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and the Fu-
ture of Tribal Self-Government, 5 AM. INDIAN L. Rav. 1 (1977). The appendix to this
Article analyzes the appropriate law applicable to both crimes on Indian lands.
3. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
4. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquam-
ish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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This Article attempts to place Oliphant within the context of the
Court's prior treatment of the tribal sovereignty issue. An attempt is
also made to predict the likely consequences of the Oliphant decision.
The major portion of this Article, however, is devoted to a critical
analysis of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Oliphant. A close examina-
tion of the Court's opinion reveals a carelessness with history, logic,
precedent, and statutory construction that is not ordinarily accepta-
ble from so august a tribunal.
II. THE COURT AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
A. SmrceT CONSENSUAL LEGITIMACY
Broadly speaking, the law of tribal sovereignty has passed
through three phases. The first, extending from the definitive 1832
decision in Worcester v. Georgia5 to the beginning of federal interven-
tion into domestic tribal affairs in the 1870s, was marked by respect
for tribal sovereignty. Under the theory of consensual legitimacy,
tribes possessed all the powers of nations except those that had been
freely and expressly delegated to the federal government. The Indian
Commerce Clause,6 the Court held, required that all terms in docu-
ments of agreement between tribes and the United States were to be
read narrowly and, where ambiguous, against any loss of tribal auton-
omy.7 The policy of strict construction was, it should be noted, a
reflection of this country's original political principles. As John Locke
had observed, legitimate political power "has its Original only from
Compact and Agreement, and the mutual Consent of those who make
up the Community."8 Anything in excess of the agreement would be
usurpation and, if successful, conquest. "But Conquest is as far from
setting up any Government as demolishing an [sic] house is from
building a new one in its place."'
B. IMPLIcIT SUBORDINATION
Beginning in 1870, however, the United States abandoned the
policy of consensual legitimacy in favor of systematic intervention in
domestic tribal affairs. Hoping to conclude swiftly the "Indian prob-
lem," Congress supported the Bureau of Indian Affairs' suppression
of tribal governments and the organization of federally-administered
5. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
6. U.S. Co-;sT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have power ... to regulate
commerce ... with the Indian Tribes.").
7. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 483, 552-54 (1832).
8. J. LocKE, Second Treatise, in Two TREATISES OF GovERNENr ch. XV, § 171
(P. Laslett ed. 1960).
9. Id. ch. XVI, § 175. See also id. § 172.
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surrogates. White Indian agents became the governors, chief justices,
and police commissioners of Indian reservations without tribal con-
sent.'" This new role contrasted with the agents' original role, as
ambassadors and foreign-aid administrators on tribal soil, under spe-
cific treaty provisions for their entry and functions. Moreover, in
1871, in a move of questionable constitutionality, Congress forbade
the President to conclude any further treaties with tribes and further
assumed direct jurisdiction over Indian territory without tribal con-
sent."
The Supreme Court did not have an opportunity to review this
change of affairs until the turn of the nineteenth century, when it
justified the new policy by suggesting that the tribes' weakness and
savagery authorized a civilized nation to extend a protectorate over
them." In Locke's terms, the Court entertained a notion of "Paternal
Power," or "nothing but that which Parents have over their Children
to govern them for the Childrens [sic] good, till they come to the use
of Reason or a state of Knowledge wherein they may be supposed
capable to understand that Rule . . .they are to govern themselves
by . . . ."3 Unlike Locke, however, who was careful to deny any
relationship between paternal power and legitimate political power,
the Court authorized an extension of Indians' "childhood" indefi-
nitely. What then was left of the right of Indians to be free from
arbitrary abuse of powers?
It is to be presumed that in this matter the United States would be
governed by such considerations of justice as would control a Chris-
tian people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race.
10. See generally W. HAGAN, INDIAN POuCE AND JUDGES (1966); F. PRUCHA, AMEI-
CANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1975); Barsh & Henderson, Tribal Courts, the Model
Code, and the Police Idea in American Indian Policy, 40 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROS. 25,
34-39 (1976).
11. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 ("[H]ereafter no Indian
nation or tribe ... shall be acknowledged or recognized as [a] power with whom [to
make a] treaty."). In floor debate Congress' power to tell the President with whom he
could negotiate under the Treaty Clause was questioned but never squarely answered.
See, e.g., 43 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1823-24 (1871). It is interesting, then,
that while Congress in 1871 concluded that it could tell the President what nations
were in the context of the Treaty Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the President
shall "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate ... make Treaties"), the courts
have repeatedly held that the definition and identification of "Indian tribes" for execu-
tion of Title 25 of the United States Code is largely a matter of executive discretion.
See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 268-72 (1942).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1926). United
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-
66 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). See also United States
v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888).
13. J. LOCKE, supra note 8, at ch. XV, § 170.
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Be that as it may, the propriety or justice of their action towards
the Indians ... is a question of governmental policy .... "
This extraordinary plenary power permitted Congress to disre-
gard the specific terms of ratified treaties'5 and the Bill of Rights
itself. In the infamous "short hair order," for instance, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs ordered Indian men to cut their hair, reasoning that
the nation's interest in "civilizing" them outweighed the first amend-
ment.'" Seizures of Indian property were likewise determined to be
too vital to the advancement of Indians' welfare to be hindered by the
fifth amendment's guarantee against uncompensated takings.
C. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
During the New Deal, the Bureau of Indian Affairs took steps to
consolidate and standardize the administration of reservations. The
Indian Reorganization Act (I.R.A.) resulted in the appearance, at
least, of tribal self-government.'" Typically drafted by the Bureau,'9
the terms of I.R.A. constitutions reflected tradeoffs between a federal
agency determined to perpetuate its power and tribes anxious to
restore theirs. Tribes regained the right to select their own officers,
but in return the agency won tribal consent to its long-exercised and
equally long-resisted power to veto tribal decisions."' Tribes that had
been the most successful at preserving their original institutions were
understandably most opposed to the enactment of I.R.A., and either
refused to adopt I.R.A. constitutions or, after adopting them,
promptly ignored them.2 '
14. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877).
15. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
16. See BOARD OF INDIAN COMISSIONERS, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 13-14 (1902).
17. The fifth amendment issue seems never to have been seriously considered.
The Supreme Court brushed it aside without direct discussion in Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), intimating only that Indians, because of their "status,"
might not have standing to raise due process claims. In a contemporary article, Har-
vard Law School Professor James Thayer conceded the seizure's confiscatory effects
without suggesting that this posed any possible constitutional problems. Thayer, The
Dawes Bill and Indians, 61 ATL'ic MomrmLY 315 (1888). Congress' power over Indi-
ans became for all intents and purposes, "unlimited." See generally Delaware Tribal
Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
551-55 (1974).
18. Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984.
19. S. REP. No. 1031, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-2, 5 (1944).
20. See SENATE JuDicIARY Comm., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERIcAN IN-
DIAN: SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS, BY THE SUBCOMM. ON CONsTrTu-
TIONAL RIGHTS, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., PURSUANT TO S. RES. 265 1-4 (Comm. Print 1964).
21. See H. R. REP. No. 2876, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 390-94 (1940) (tabulation of
tribes voting to adopt or reject the act); T. HAS, Ten Years of Tribal Government
[Vol. 63:609
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This period of consolidation also led to the formulation of a new
theory justifying federal power over Indian affairs. The two men most
responsible for this theory, Interior Department Solicitor Nathan
Margold and his assistant Felix Cohen, drew their inspiration, ironi-
cally, from the eighteenth-century British imperial doctrine of con-
quest. In their respective writings,2 both Margold and Cohen closely
paraphrased The Case of Granada2n which in 1774 concluded that
conquered nations retain all the powers of sovereign nations until
Parliament declares otherwise. 24 Analogizing to the American situa-
tion, Margold and Cohen argued that tribes are conquered nations
whose inherent powers are unilaterally limitable only by Congress. As
Margold wrote,
An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any
sovereign State .... These powers are subject to be qualified by
treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but save as thus
expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in
Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government.2
The conquest theory, as formulated by Margold and Cohen, dis-
approves judicial speculation about the powers and limitations im-
plied in the tribes' "condition." Judges must confine themselves once
again to case-by-case analysis of documents and, like the Marshall
Court, construe ambiguous expressions in tribes' favor.26 There is only
one difference: although the Marshall Court looked to tribal treaties
for guidance, the New Deal Court, Margold and Cohen reasoned,
should look to statutes.
D. CONCLUSION: RECENT DIRECTIONS
The Supreme Court continues to proclaim adherence to the clear
intent of Congress in adjudicating cases involving conflicts between
state and tribal jurisdiction. Following the Margold-Cohen analysis,
the Court has assumed that tribal power can only be limited by
Congress. Moreover, the scope of congressional grants to the states
must be narrowly construed, with the presumption being against any
diminution of tribal self-government. A review of the important cases
Under LR.A., in BuREAu OF INDIAN AFFAIRS TRIBAL RELATIONS PAMPHLET No. 1 (U.S.
Indian Serv., Dep't of Interior 1947) (listing the tribes organized in the first decade of
the act).
22. Margold was the author of a pivotal solicitor's opinion, 55 Interior Dec. 14
(1934), and Cohen wrote the HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDAN LAW (1942).
23. See 55 Interior Dec. 14, 22 (1934); F. COHEN, supra note 22, at 122.
24. The Case of Granada (Campbell v. Hall), 1 Cowp. 204, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045
(1774) (a case which, interestingly, Cohen and Margold did not cite).
25. 55 Interior Dec. at 22.
26. See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
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of the last twenty years indicates, however, that the Court has failed
to apply this standard consistently.
In the seminal case of recent years, Williams v. Lee,21 the Court
held that state courts had no jurisdiction over civil suits by non-
Indians against Indians for causes of action arising on reservations.
Announcing the now-classic formula governing tribal sovereignty, the
Court stated, "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reserva-
tion Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.", This
language suggests a two-tiered test in which the question of whether
a state action infringed on the rights of Indians to govern themselves
is reached only if there is no applicable federal statute. The Court
found that the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act, 9 which contained a
very vague and general grant of tribal power,3" preempted a claim of
state jurisdiction over the Navajo reservation. Yet, the Court also
went on to find that the state action infringed tribal self-
government.3 By seeming to depart from a simple two-tiered test, the
Court raised a question as to whether a general congressional grant
of tribal power will in fact govern a specific assertion of state jurisdic-
tion.
The question unanswered by the Williams decision was further
complicated by the opinion in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Commission,32 a 1973 decision in which it was held that a state may
not impose an income tax on revenue earned by Indians from reserva-
tion sources. Like the Court in Williams, the McClanahan Court
combined a finding that the state's claim was barred by a federal
statute, with a holding that the state's assertion of jurisdiction in-
fringed on the Indian tribe's right of self-government. Indeed, the
McClanahan Court suggested a new approach to the question of con-
gressional preemption of state jurisdicton. Instead of asking, as did
the Court in Williams, whether there were governing acts recognizing
tribal jurisdiction, the McClanahan Court looked for acts of Congress
diminishing tribal powers. Finding none, the McClanahan Court rea-
soned that the tribe's inherent power remained intact.
27. 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
28. Id. at 220.
29. Pub. L. No. 81-474, 64 Stat. 44 (1950) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 631-640
(1976)).
30. The statute recognized the right of the Navajo to establish a constitution
containing "any powers vested in the tribe or any organ thereof by existing law, to-
gether with such additional powers as the members of the tribe may, with the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior, deem proper to include therein." Id.
31. 358 U.S. at 223.
32. 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
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In its 1976 per curiam opinion in Fisher v. District Court,3 3 the
Court covered all bases. Following Williams,31 it first held that the
tribal self-government provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act
were governing, and that they preempted state laws and affirmatively
recognized tribal jurisdiction. 6 The Court then followed the
McClanahan analysis by noting that "[n]o federal statute sanctions
this [state] interference with tribal government. ' 3 The Court finally
held, as did the Williams and McClanahan Courts, that the state
action constituted an infringement on retained powers of tribal self-
government.3 8 State jurisdiction was impermissible because it had
been preempted, was not sanctioned, and infringed upon tribal laws.
The Supreme Court now had ennunciated three different tests.
In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes39 the Court
attempted to dispel the confusion generated by Fisher by discovering
still another test buried in Williams: race. Observing that in
Williams, McClanahan, and Fisher the party challenging the state
action was a tribal member, Justice Rehnquist proposed separate
standards for Indians and non-Indians. To be permissible, state juris-
diction over Indians must be based on authority drawn from specific
acts of Congress." As the Court later made clear, federal laws would
be construed against state claims." The non-Indian side of Moe de-
parted from the Williams line of cases in the opposite direction: to
be permissible, state action simply must not fall under any powers
specifically delegated by Congress to the tribes."2 The Indian and
33. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
34. Id. at 386.
35. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
36. 424 U.S. at 386-87, 390.
37. Id. at 388.
38. Id.
39. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). Moe involved an attempt by the state of Montana to
extend its jurisdiction to tax sales revenue acquired from reservation sources. The
Court held that the state was prohibited from recovering the tax from Indians, but
indicated that the state could recover the tax from non-Indians.
40. "[A]bsent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it,
there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian
income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation. . . ." 425
U.S. at 475-76 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)).
The Court reserved the issue of whether "Indians" included all tribal Indians or was
limited to members of the tribe in whose territory the transaction in question had
occurred. 425 U.S. at 480 n.16.
41. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379-87 (1976).
42. The Court found state law dispositive of the liability of non-Indians for the
state tax imposed on reservation sales. 425 U.S. at 481-82. The Court suggested that,
absent a federal statute expressly prohibiting state taxation of non-Indian reservation
activities, Montana's tax would not run "afoul of [a] congressional enactment dealing
with the affairs of reservation Indians." Id. at 483. Although Moe addressed the issue
1979]
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non-Indian tests are therefore perfect mirror images. Each govern-
ment is presumed to enjoy exclusive control over its own people ex-
cept where Congress has specifically delegated this power to the
other.4 3
It should be noted that the Moe test for the assertion of jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians had little precedent." It will be remembered
that within a year of the adoption of the Indian Reorganization Act,45
Interior Department Solicitor Margold described Indian tribes as pos-
sessing all attributes of original national sovereignty except those
expressly taken away by Congress in treaties or statutes." The Court
has invoked this model of power with approval for forty years, albeit
without consistent application. After Moe, however, it appears that,
in the absence of express congressional delegation of power, tribes
possess only those attributes of self-government consistent with their
status as Indian tribes, as determined by the Court. This novel doc-
trine gives the Court much greater flexibility and independence from
Congress in redefining tribal sovereignty than it has hitherto enjoyed.
Moe, it is clear, sharply redefined the Court's role in adjudicating
controversies regarding tribal sovereignty.
III. OLIPHANT V. SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE AND THE
FAILURE OF JUDICIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP
In result, Oliphant follows the split-rules pattern of Moe, and
therefore is subject to many of the same criticisms. This similarility
in approach is no great surprise, since both opinions were penned by
the same justice within a year of one another. What is both surprising
and distressing is the way in which Justice Rehnquist took it upon
himself to argue that Congress and the courts had always assumed
that tribal jurisdiction did not extend to non-Indian criminals, and
that this implicit assumption was supported by considerations of
public policy. It is in the attempt to support these assertions that the
of state jurisdiction over non-Indian reservation residents, there is no reason to believe
that Moe's two-pronged test will not also be applied to tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. Indeed, an earlier article predicted this result. Barsh, supra note 2, at 37.
43. Justice Rehnquist did not, however, resist muddying the waters again by
arguing that state jurisdiction over non-Indians in Moe was also permissible because
it did not infringe on tribal self-government. Id.
44. To find any earlier suggestion of Justice Rehnquist's approach, one must go
back to 1946, when Justice Black announced in New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326
U.S. 496, 499 (1946), that "in the absence of a limiting treaty obligation or Congres-
sional enactment each state [has] a right to exercise jurisdiction over Indian reserva-
tions within its boundaries." However, Black later recanted this rule in Williams. See
text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
45. Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984.
46. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 22 (1934).
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Oliphant opinion exhibits an unusual propensity for the selective use
of history, assuming conclusions, and even according greater weight
to defeated bills than enacted law. Oliphant is also characterized by
what may be called gestalt jurisprudence, conjecturing at length
about long-dead individuals' unexpressed motivations, passions, and
beliefs and exalting this speculation to the status of written law.
The pages that follow attempt to classify the most serious flaws
in Oliphant and suggest why they should concern jurists as well as
advocates for tribes. In each section we have focused attention on the
single line of reasoning in Oliphant we feel is most illustrative of the
problem.
A. HISTORICAL INFERENCES
1. Selectivity
Drawing inferences from historical evidence is a cumulative logi-
cal approach: one must show that the evidence supporting a hypothe-
sis is more abundant and consistent than the evidence against it. In
Oliphant, however, Justice Rehnquist built sweeping generalizations
out of isolated events. In many instances what he described as typical
proves to be unusual.
At the outset, for instance, Justice Rehnquist set forth his hy-
pothesis that "[flrom the earliest treaties . . . it was apparently
assumed that the tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty provision to that
effect."'" For example, Justice Rehnquist continued, the United
States' 1830 treaty with the Choctaws mentioned the tribe's "wish
that Congress may grant to the Choctaws the right of punishing by
their own laws any white man who shall come into their nation, and
infringe any of their national regulations." 8
The 1830 Choctaw treaty is, however, the only treaty to use this
specific language-one out of 366. Furthermore Justice Rehnquist
completely missed an important distinction between tribes. The
Choctaw treaty was negotiated under special circumstances applica-
ble only to the eight "emigrant" tribes that had been deeded western
lands in fee simple, in exchange for their aboriginal homes in the
east.4 Since these tribes held their territory as landowners rather
47. 435 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).
48. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Act of Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333 (Choctaw
1830, art. IV)). See C. KAPPLER, 2 INDIAN AI TAS: LAws AND TREATIES 311 (1904).
Kappler's compilation was printed for the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs and
remains the only official single-volume source of all U.S. Indian treaties. Indian treat-
ies are dispersed through twenty volumes of the Statutes at Large.
49. These treaties include: Act of Aug. 8, 1846, 9 Stat. 871 (Cherokee 1846, art.
1979]
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than as sovereigns, it is not surprising that their treaties included
provisions delegating to them limited powers of self-government." In
contrast, the United States has treaties with almost one hundred
non-emigrant tribes. Not one of these treaties purports to delegate
power to the tribe. Indian treaties therefore fall into two groups: those
with emigrant tribes, which delegate power, and those with other
tribes, which, if they address tribal power at all, limit it. Justice
Rehnquist, however, took the relationship of an emigrant tribe to the
United States as perfectly representative of all tribal-federal relation-
ships. He incorrectly used an isolated case of an emigrant tribe's
request for a delegation of additional power as evidence that all tribal
powers are delegated.
Justice Rehnquist advanced another piece of "evidence" to sup-
port his assertion that "[t]he history of Indian treaties . . . is consis-
tent with the principle that Indian tribes may not assume criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians without the permission of Congress." 5'
To demonstrate this "consistency," Justice Rehnquist wrote that the
"earliest treaties typically expressly provided that 'any citizen of the
United States, who shall do an injury to any Indian of the [tribal]
nation, or to any other Indian or Indians residing in their towns, and
under their protection, shall be punished according to the laws of the
United States.' "52
It is readily apparent, however, that there is no "typical" ar-
rangement for nontribal criminal jurisdiction. The quoted language,
for example, appears in only one treaty." Indeed, there are thirteen
different combinations of subject-matter, citizenship, and choice of
I); Act of July 22, 1846, 9 Stat. 853 (Potawatomi 1846, art. IV); Act of Feb. 18, 1837, 7
Stat. 532 (Potawatomi 1837, art. I); Act of May 23, 1836, 7 Stat. 478 (Cherokee 1835,
art II); Act of Apr. 12, 1834, 7 Stat. 424 (Quapaw 1833, art. II); Act of Apr. 12, 1834, 7
Stat. 417 (Creeks 1833, art. II); Act of Apr. 12, 1834, 7 Stat. 414 (Cherokee 1833, art.
I); Act of Apr. 6, 1832, 7 Stat. 478 (Shawnee 1831, art II); Act of Apr. 6, 1832, 7 Stat.
359 (Ottawa 1831, art. II); Act of Apr. 6, 1832, 7 Stat. 351 (Seneca 1838, art. II); Act
of March 24, 1831, 7 Stat. 348 (Seneca 1831, art. II); Act of Feb. 24, 1831, 7 Stat. 333
(Choctaw 1830, art. II). See C. KAPPLER, supra note 48.
50. These treaties include: Act of July 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 531 (Potawatomi 1867,
art. I); Act of Aug. 16, 1856, 11 Stat. 699 (Creek 1856, arts. IV, XV); Act of Feb. 21,
1856, 11 Stat. 611 (Choctaw and Chickasaw 1855, art. VII); Act of Apr. 4, 1840, 7 Stat.
550 (New York Indians 1838, art. IV); Act of May 23, 1836, 7 Stat. 478 (Cherokee 1835,
preamble, art. V); Act of Apr. 6, 1832, 7 Stat. 351 (Seneca 1831, art. XI); Act of Apr.
4, 1832, 7 Stat. 366 (Creek 1832, art. XIV); Act of Feb. 24, 1831, 7 Stat. 333 (Choctaw
1830, art. IV); Act of May 28, 1828, 7 Stat. 311 (Cherokee 1828, preamble). See C.
KAPPLER, supra note 48.
51. 435 U.S. at 197-98 n.8.
52. Id. (emphasis added) (brackets by the Court) (quoting Act of Jan. 31, 1786,
7 Stat. 26 (Shawnee 1786, art. I)).
53. Act of Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26 (Shawnee 1786, art. I).
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law criteria, as we illustrate in the appendix to this Article. An addi-
tional eleven treaty tribes made no jurisdictional arrangements with
the United States at all. 4 If Justice Rehnquist meant to imply that
tribes "typically" gave up jurisdiction over "injuries" committed by
non-Indians, the implication is clearly false. Moreover, the language
he quoted, even if representative of most treaties, is just as consistent
with concurrent tribal and federal criminal jurisdiction; it does not
say United States citizens shall only be punished according to the
laws of the United States.
As his argument continued, Justice Rehnquist asserted that
early treaties "generally provided" that "if any citizen of the United
States. .. shall attempt to settle on any of the lands hereby allotted
to the Indians to live and hunt on, such persons shall forfeit the
protection of the United States of America, and the Indians may
punish him or not as they please. '15 This language is, to be sure, a
little more "general" than his earlier quotation was "typical," for it
can be found in seven of the United States' 366 ratified Indian treat-
ies.5 Its meaning is, however, ambiguous. Is it a promise by the
United States not to interfere with the exercise of a preexisting tribal
power, or is it, instead, an affirmative grant of power? The Court does
not clarify the ambiguity.
Justice Rehnquist concluded by observing,
Only one treaty signed by the United States has ever provided
for any form of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians ...
[T]he 1778 Treaty with the Delawares, provided that neither party
to the treaty could "proceed to the infliction of punishment on the
citizens of the other, otherwise than by securing the offender or
offenders by imprisonment, or any other competent means, till a fair
and impartial trial can be had by judges and juries of both parties,
as near as can be to the laws, customs, and usages of the contracting
54. These tribes are the Cahokia, Chippewa (except the Mississippi Band), Flor-
ida Indians, Iowa, Kickapoo, Menominee, Miami, Omaha, Ottawa, Potawatomi, and
Winnebago. See C. KAPPLER, supra note 48.
55. 435 U.S. at 198 n.8 (brackets and ellipses by the Court) (quoting Act of Jan.
3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21 (Choctaw 1786, art. IV)).
56. These treaties include: Act of Feb. 7, 1792, 7 Stat. 39 (Cherokee 1791, art.
VIII); Act. of Aug. 13, 1790, 7 Stat. 35 (Creek 1790, art. VI); Act. of Sept. 27, 1789, 7
Stat. 28 (Wyandot 1789, art. IX); Act of Jan. 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26 (Shawnee 1786, art.
VII) (identical in operation but differs in terminology); Act of Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21
(Choctaw 1786, art. IV); Act of Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18 (Cherokee 1785, art. V); Act
of Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16 (Choctaw 1786, art. IV). These treaties can be fairly called
representative only of the treaties made between 1778 and 1791, of which there were
12 in all. See C. KAPPLER, supra note 48, at 3-33. As Justice Rehnquist admitted,
"[later treaties dropped this provision and provided instead that non-Indian settlers
would be removed by the United States upon complaint being lodged by the tribe."
435 U.S. at 198 n.8.
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parties and natural justice: The mode of such tryals [sic] to be
hereafter fixed by the wise men of the United States in Congress
assembled, with the assistance of . . . deputies of the Delaware
nation .... "-7
This language, according to Justice Rehnquist, "established that
non-Indians could only be tried under the auspices of the United
States and in a manner fixed by the Continental Congress.""8 That
is not, however, what the Delaware treaty says. Justice Rehnquist
edited a crucial phrase from the last line of the quoted article:
"[W]ith the assistance of such deputies of the Delaware nation, as
may be appointed to act in concert with them in adjusting this matter
to their mutual liking.' _" Thus stated, the agreement required the
mutual consent of both parties, not, as Justice Rehnquist suggested,
federal legislation with tribal consultation.
There is, one might add, at least one other example of an express
recognition of tribal criminal authority over non-Indians in a treaty.
An 1820 treaty obligates the United States to pay the expenses of the
Choctaw Nation's previously organized "corps of Light-Horse, consis-
ting of ten in each district, so that good order may be maintained,
and that all men, both white and red, may be compelled to pay their
just debts," and for the removal of "bad men" from their country.6 '
Admittedly, the jurisdiction explicitly acknowledged in this treaty
could have been either delegated or original in its source. On the other
hand, no Choctaw treaty prior to 1820 expressly granted the tribe
jurisdiction of any kind, suggesting that any powers already enjoyed
by the Light-Horse in 1820 were believed to be inherent in tribal
sovereignty.
In the final analysis, Justice Rehnquist cited only six treaties out
of 366. None of the articles he quoted appear, on examination, to have
been representative; one treaty he relied on is unique, and another
has been materially misquoted. From this insubstantial foundation,
Justice Rehncuist concluded that tribal treaties acquiesced in a his-
torical federal policy against tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians."1
57. 435 U.S. at 198 n.8 (emphasis and ellipses by the Court).
58. Id. at 199 n.8.
59. Act of Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13 (Delawares 1778, art. IV), reprinted in C.
KAPPLER, supra note 48, at 4 (language omitted by Justice Rehnquist in italics).
60. Act of Jan. 8, 1821, 7 Stat. 210 (Choctaw 1820, art. XIII). The Light-Horse
was an indigenous institution, not a product of federal intervention, although its devel-
opment was influenced by intermarried non-Indians. A. DBO, Tm isE AND FALL OF
Tm CHOCTAW REPusLic 45-46 (1934).
61. To be sure, Justice Rehnquist wrote, the treaties he discussed were "not
necessary to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians from the Indian tribes." 435
U.S. at 198 n.8. Why, then, did the United States go to the time and expense of
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2. The Implication of Silence
Early in the opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that later Indian
treaties omitted mention of specific arrangements for tribal criminal
jurisdiction. As evidence, he submitted "the treaties signed by Wash-
ington Indians in the 1850's."11 Several pages later in the opinion,
however, Justice Rehnquist recanted, saying that, although one such
treaty, the Point Elliott Treaty, "would appear to be silent as to
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the addition of histori-
cal perspective casts substantial doubt upon the existence of such
jurisdiction."" In the explanatory footnote, intended to provide this
perspective, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs sent copies of the Omaha and Oto treaties to the Point
Elliott commissioners in the way of "valuable suggestions."6 The
commissioners, in turn, sent the tribes a draft that included an ex-
plicit provision for federal prosecution of non-Indians' crimes. "For
some unexplained reason," as Justice Rehnquist described it, this
provision was not adopted and the treaty went to the Senate without
it." This does not mean the provision had been unacceptable to the
Indians, Justice Rehnquist explained, since "there is no evidence to
support this view of the matter."" Rather, "it seems probable" that
the commissioners ended up falling back on language that "could
well have been understood as acknowledging exclusive federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians."6
Here is the ultimate absurdity of historical inference: resolving
silence in favor of the hypothesis. There is no evidence to support
either view of the matter, no basis on which to judge what was
"probably" intended. The conclusion is simply assumed. And while
negotiating them-indeed, of negotiating so many different versions? The answer,
Justice Rehnquist asserted, is that the treaties "served an important function in the
developing stage of United States-Indian relations by clarifying jurisdictional limits
to the Indian Tribes." Id.
One should not, however, hastily accept Justice Rehnquist's attempt to explain
why the United States would bother to make unnecessary agreements. Obviously, if
the function of these treaties was simply to advise Indians clearly of their rights and
responsibilities, Congress could have simply gone ahead and advised them. Why go
through the charade of negotiating a treaty and obtaining Senate ratification if the
only objective was to "clarify" things to Indians? Not only is Justice Rehnquist's
analysis purely speculative, it imputes to Congress a considerable degree of irrational-
ity.
62. 435 U.S. at 198 n.8.
63. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 207 n.16. Justice Rehnquist gives no citation for this history.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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it is true that no other conclusion can be proved, there are valid
reasons to be skeptical of Justice Rehnquist's reconstruction of the
treaty commissioners' motivations. After all, the commissioners with-
drew a jurisdictional article only after meeting with the tribes. One
could reasonably conclude, therefore, that the United States was not
the exclusive force behind the article's withdrawal. Apart from histor-
ical methodology, there are rules of law for uncertainty. Like con-
tracts, treaties are generally read for what they actually say, not what
was proposed or discussed beforehand."8 Justice Rehnquist even ad-
mitted that in the interpretation of Indian treaties the rule has been
that "[d]oubtful expressions" are to be resolved in tribes' favor."
When the treaty is silent it ought not to be construed against tribal
sovereignty.
'Justice Rehnquist concluded, however, that the jurisdictional
intentions of the Point Elliot Treaty were not "doubtful" at all, but
"clear from the surrounding circumstances."7 For example, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned, the signatory tribes "acknowledge their depend-
ence on the Government of the United States."71 Justice Rehnquist
translates this as "in all probability recognizing that the United
States would arrest and try non-Indian intruders.""2 Why is this
specific jurisdictional arrangement "probably" implied in "depend-
ence"? The answer, Justice Rehnquist wrote, may be found in Chief
Justice John Marshall's conclusion in Worcester v. Georgia, that
states, "The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily
dependent on some foreign potentate for the supply of their essential
wants, and for their protection from lawless intrusions into their
country.73 This appears to confirm, in the mind of Justice Rehnquist,
that "dependency" is a term of art meaning "protection from lawless
intrusions."
Unlike Justice Rehnquist, however, Chief Justice Marshall was
68. See Choctaw Nation v. United States, 179 U.S. 494, 532-33 (1900), in which
the Court declared that "in no case has it been adjudged that the courts could by mere
interpretation or in deference to its view as to what was right under all the circumstan-
ces, incorporate into an Indian treaty something that was inconsistent with the clear
import of its words." Although the meaning of a treaty provision may be subject to
construction in the light of its history, see Seminole Nation v. United States, 78 Ct.Cl.
455, 458 (1933), contradictory parole evidence is excluded. See generally Fish v. Wise,
52 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 903 (1931).
69. 435 U.S. at 208 n.17 (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973)).
70. Id. (quoting DeCoteau v. District Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975) (clarity
may be gained from legislative history)).
71. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 8, 1859, 12 Stat. 927 (Point Elliott Treaty, art. IX)).
72. Id.
73. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832), quoted in 435 U.S. at 207.
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loathe to read too much into the general language of Indian treaties.
As the Chief Justice wrote, "Is it reasonable to suppose, that the
Indians, who could not write, and most probably could not read, who
certainly were not critical judges of our language," could understand
the niceties of legal vocabulary?74 Interpreting an article in the Chero-
kees' treaty granting Congress "the sole and exclusive right of regu-
lating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs,"75
the Chief Justice stated,
To construe the expression "managing all their affairs," into a sur-
render of self-government, would be, we think, a perversion of their
necessary meaning, and a departure from the construction which
has been uniformly put upon them ... It is... inconceivable that
[the Cherokees] could have supposed themselves, by a phrase thus
slipped into an article, on another and most interesting subject, to
have divested themselves of the right of self-government on subjects
not connected with trade."
The Point Elliott Treaty also required the tribes "not to shelter
or conceal offenders against the laws of the United States, but to
deliver them up to the authorities for trial. '77 Justice Rehnquist con-
strued this passage to recognize exclusive federal criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians in Indian country. One may, however, read it
as an extradition agreement, applicable to fugitives from federal
prosecution in the states. Twenty-two Indian treaties provide for
tribal extradition of non-Indians accused of crimes under federal law,
state law, or both.7 Two treaties provide for mutual extradition.7
74. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552.
75. Act of Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18 (Cherokee 1785, art. IX).
76. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 553-54. Ironically, this approach, which is in clear opposi-
tion with Justice Rehnquist's approach, was not mentioned in Oliphant, though
Oliphant does cite for another proposition to the same page of Chief Justice Marshall's
opinioh that contains the above quotation.
77. Act of Mar. 8, 1859, 12 Stat. 927 (Point Elliott Treaty, art. IX).
78. These 22 treaties are as follows: Act of July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 785 (Creek 1866,
art. X); Act of June 28, 1866, 14 Stat. 769 (Choctaw & Chickasaw 1866, art. XLII);
Act of July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 755 (Seminole 1866, art. VII); Act of Mai. 25, 1864, 13
Stat. 673 (Tabequache Utes 1863, art. VI); Act of Feb. 21, 1856, 11 Stat. 611 (Choctaw
& Chickasaw 1855, art. XV); Act of Feb. 24, 1831,7 Stat. 333 (Choctaw 1830, art. VIII);
Act of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat. 282 (Makah 1825, art. V); Act of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat. 279
(Pawnee 1825, art. V); Act of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat. 277 (Oto & Missouri 1825, art. V);
Act of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat. 266 (Crow 1825, art. V); Act of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat. 264
(Mandan 1825, art. VI); Act of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat. 261 (Minitaree 1825, art. VI); Act
of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat. 259 (Arikara 1825, art. VI); Act of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat. 257
(Hunkpapa Sioux 1825, art. V); Act of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat. 255 (Cheyenne 1825, art.
V); Act of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat. 252 (Sioune & Oglala Sioux 1825, art. V); Act of Feb.
6, 1826, 7 Stat. 250 (Yancton & Teton Sioux 1825, art. V); Act of Feb. 6, 1826, 7 Stat.
247 (Ponca 1825, art. V); Act of Dec. 30, 1825, 7 Stat. 244 (Kansas 1825, art. X); Act
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One may wonder if Justice Rehnquist would be willing to construe
these two treaties as surrendering to the tribes exclusive criminal
jurisdiction off-reservation.
The real issue here -is the exclusivity of the jurisdiction. The
phrase "offenders against the laws of the United States" would have
the meaning Justice Rehnquist proposed only if the United States
already enjoyed exclusive criminal jurisdiction in Indian country
from some other, more explicit source. He suggested one: the provi-
sion in the 1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act for the extension
to "Indian Country" of the "general criminal laws of the United
States."80
There are several reasons why this argument fails. The 1834 Act
does not speak of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Federal laws may
extend to certain cases without obstructing the parallel operation of
tribal laws, as the Supreme Court itself reaffirmed a month after
Oliphant.' The act excepts from its application cases in which the
tribe has, "by treaty stipulations . . . , exclusive jurisdiction." This
does not rule out concurrent tribal jurisdiction. At.the same time it
poses an important question: must the tribal reservation of jurisdic-
tion be express? Is exclusive tribal jurisdiction assumed to exist un-
less expressly surrendered or assumed to be surrendered unless ex-
pressly reserved? The act is unclear. It is even debatable whether the
act was intended to apply to non-consenting tribes, for the United
of Jan. 5, 1819, 7 Stat. 176 (Quapaw 1818, art. VI); Act of Apr. 28, 1810, 7 Stat. 107
(Osage 1808, art. IX); Act of Jan. 25, 1805, 7 Stat. 84 (Sauk & Fox 1804, art. V); See
C. KAPPLER, supra note 48.
Other treaties enjoined tribes not to "shelter or conceal" fugitives from federal or
state laws. These were: Act of Mar. 8, 1859, 12 Stat. 975 (Flatheads 1855, art. VIII);
Act of Mar. 8, 1859, 12 Stat. 971 (Quinaielt 1855, art. VIII); Act of Mar. 8, 1859, 12
Stat. 957 (Nez Perce 1855, art. VIII); Act of Mar. 8, 1859, 12 Stat. 951 (Yakima 1855,
art. VIII); Act of Mar. 8, 1859, 12 Stat. 939 (Makah 1855, art. IX); Act of Mar. 8, 1859,
12 Stat. 933 (S'Klallam 1855, art. IX); Act of Mar. 8, 1859, 12 Stat. 927 (Duwamish
1855, art. IX); Act of Apr. 15, 1856, 11 Stat. 657 (Blackfeet 1855, art. XI); Act of Mar.
3, 1855, 10 Stat. 1132 (Nisqualli 1854, art. VII). See C. KAPPLER, supra note 48.
Still other treaties exhorted affirmative aid from Indians, requesting them to turn
over fugitives. See Act of Mar. 8, 1859, 12 Stat. 1037 (Sioux 1858, art. VI); Act of Mar.
9, 1859, 12 Stat. 1031 (Sioux 1858, art. VI); Act of Mar. 8, 1859, 12 Stat. 997 (Ponca
1858, art. VII); Act of Feb. 16, 1859, 11 Stat. 743 (Yankton Sioux 1858, art. XI); See
C. KAPPLER, supra note 48, at 775-87.
In one treaty the tribe simply promised to "assist" in the capture of fugitives. Act
of Mar. 31, 1858, 11 Stat. 729 (Pawnee 1857, art. VI).
79. These treaties are: Act of Aug. 8, 1846, 9 Stat. 871 (Cherokee 1846, art. II);
Act of Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13 (Delaware 1778, art. IV). See C. KAPPLER, supra note
48, at 561; id. at 4.
80. Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729, ch. 161 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976))
(cited in 435 U.S. at 208).
81. See U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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States continued to negotiate individualized jurisdictional articles for
another thirty years.
3. The Fallacy of Implied Enactment
Justice Rehnquist's opinion also relied heavily on an 1834 House
Report that recommended enactment of the "Western Territory
Bill." The bill would have established a general framework for tribal
government in the Indian territory.n Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Congress was careful not to give the tribes of the territory criminal
jurisdiction over United States officials and citizens traveling
through the area. The reasons were quite practical:
"Officers, and persons in the service of the United States, and
persons required to reside in the Indian country by treaty stipula-
tion, must necessarily be placed under the protection, and subject
to the laws of the United States. To persons merely travelling in the
Indian country the same protection is extended. The want of fixed
laws, of competent tribunals of justice, which must for some time
continue in the Indian country, absolutely requires for the peace of
both sides that this protection be extended.""
This language, Justice Rehnquist concluded, indicates that
"Congress shared the view of the Executive Branch and lower federal
courts that Indian tribal courts were without jurisdiction to try non-
Indians.""
To begin with, the bill was tabled; a fact which Justice Rehn-
quist reserved for the footnotes." The bill therefore reflects the
views of a single committee, not Congress. Furthermore, Justice
Rehnquist stopped short of quoting all of the 1834 report's "practical
reasons." What he omitted is enlightning: "[A]s to those persons
82. H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. (1834) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
474].
83. See 10 CONG. DEB. 4763-79 (1834) (House discussion of the bill).
84. 435 U.S. at 202 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 474, at 18 (footnote and citation omit-
ted)).
85. Id. at 203.
86. 435 U.S. at 202 n.13.
Justice Rehnquist, by reasoning that inaction on the bill was due to its incorpora-
tion of "too radical a shift in [policy]," id., overlooked the fact that most of its
features were incorporated in subsequent "removal" treaties with the emigrant tribes,
including those cited in note 49 supra. This is highly significant: Congress chose not
to impose a territorial government on tribes by statute, as the "Western Territory Bill"
proposed, preferring instead to obtain the same result by negotiation and mutual
consent. Congress may indeed have had doubts only two years after the Supreme
Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), as to whether it
had authority to alter tribal institutions unilaterally. See text accompanying note 7
supra.
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not required to reside in the Indian country, who voluntarily go there
to reside, they must be considered as voluntarily submitting to the
laws of the tribes."87 Far from suggesting that tribal criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians is "inconsistent with their status," the
committee described such power as inherent, subject to defeasance
by Congress: "the right of self-government is secured to each tribe,
with jurisdiction over all persons and property within its limits,
subject to certain exceptions, founded on principles analogous to
international laws among civilized nations."
Except as qualified by the bill," then, the power and jurisdiction
of emigrant tribes in the Indian Territory was to be "exclusive." 0
Justice Rehnquist was careful, however, not to be caught barefaced.
In another footnote he admits that the Western Territory Bill "did
not extend the protection of the United States to non-Indians who
settled without Government business in Indian territory."', This
technique has been seen before. In the text, facts are presented and
a strong conclusion is drawn: "Indian tribal courts were without juris-
diction to try non-Indians."9 Then, in the footnotes, contradictions
in the facts are admitted. The product is a kind of half-truth.
How are the text and notes reconciled? The 1834 Committee
Report described the immunity of travellers and federal employees as
well as the exceptions to a general rule of "exclusive" tribal jurisdic-
tion. Justice Rehnquist reversed this in the notes, characterizing the
vulnerability of all other non-Indians to tribal prosecution as the
exception to a general rule against tribal jurisdiction. "This excep-
tion, like that in the early treaties, was presumably meant to discour-
age settlement on land that was reserved exclusively for the use of the
various Indian tribes. 9 3
Justice Rehnquist, it is clear, confused means and ends. It is
immaterial why the House Committee thought tribal criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians was a good idea. It might be relevant, how-
ever, whether they conceived of the bill, had it passed, as limiting or
delegating tribal criminal jurisdiction. Justice Rehnquist omitted
from his discussion the Report's direct remarks on the nature of tribal
87. H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 82, at 18 (emphasis added).
88. Id. According to the report, this right had been secured by treaties. Id. at 13-
14.
89. The only proposed exceptions to exclusive tribal jurisdiction were: (1) diplo-
matic immunity for travellers and federal employees; (2) non-Indians engaged in law-
ful commerce with the Indians; and (3) a prerogative of the territorial governor to
pardon non-Indians convicted in tribal courts of a capital offense. Id. at 18-19.
90. Id. 13-14.
91. 435 U.S. at 202 n.13 (emphasis omitted).
92. Id. at 203; see text accompanying note 85 supra.
93. Id. at 202 n.13.
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power, preferring instead to speculate, without documentation, on
what was "presumably" the draftsmen's policy on white settlement.
The final stroke of illogic in this argument is Justice Rehnquist's
implicit challenge to the Suquamish Tribe that it "point to [some]
statute, in comparison with the Western Territory Bill, where Con-
gress has intended to give Indian tribes jurisdiction today over non-
Indians residing within reservations."' 4 The suggestion that a failed
bill is an expression of intent until countermanded by positive legisla-
tion is hardly persuasive.
There are other occasions in Oliphant for Justice Rehnquist to
argue from evidence of inaction:
In 1854, for example, Congress amended the Trade and Intercourse
Act to proscribe the prosecution in federal court of an Indian who
has already been tried in tribal court .... No similar provision,
such as would have been required by parallel logic if tribal courts
had jurisdiction over non-Indians, was enacted barring retrial of
non-Indians."
The implicit assumption here appears to be that laws must have an
equal effect on Indians and non-Indians. On the contrary, the Court
has repeatedly upheld national policies discriminating in favor of or
against Indians." Yet, Justice Rehnquist assumed that Congress
would never have knowingly subjected non-Indians to greater legal
burdens than Indians.
This idea of "parallel logic" may be further investigated:
[I]n the Major Crimes Act of 1885, Congress placed under the
jurisdiction of federal courts Indian offenders who commit certain
specified major offenses .... If tribal courts may try non-Indians,
however, as respondents contend, those tribal courts are free to try
non-Indians even for such major offenses as Congress may well have
given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to try members of
their own tribe committing the exact same offenses. 7
Once again, an implicit assumption is made that non-Indians must
never be subjected to greater liability than Indians. It is not, however,
inconceivable that Congress would, at times, find it expedient to
assure the orderliness of one group or the other by adding the threat
of federal prosecution to the pre-existing threat of tribal punishment.
A Congress occupied with preventing intrusions on tribal land would
reasonably look chiefly to increasing the sanctions against non-
94. Id.
95. 435 U.S. at 203 (citation omitted).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (law regulating the
introduction of alcohol on tribal land).
97. 435 U.S. at 203 (emphasis by the Court) (citation omitted).
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Indians, while a Congress attempting to protect white settlers from
their reservation neighbors would likely look first to increasing the
sanctions against Indians.
It does not appear that Justice Rehnquist's emphasis on failed
measures was a product of error or carelessness. Rather, it revealed
an important shift in the Court's perception of its role as interpreter
of federal legislation. Justice Rehnquist's approach reflected a kind
of gestalt jurisprudence, a preoccupation with sociopolitical history
so great that the Court, in effect, legislated an issue on which Con-
gress did not act. Justice Rehnquist was, in fact, candid enough about
what he did:
While not conclusive on the issue before us, the commonly
shared presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower
federal courts that tribal courts do not have the power to try non-
Indians carries considerable weight. . . . "Indian law" draws
principally upon the treaties drawn and executed by the Executive
Branch and legislation passed by Congress. These instruments,
which beyond their actual text form the backdrop for the intricate
web of judicially made Indian law, cannot be interpreted in isolation
but must be read in light of the common notions of the day and the
assumptions of those who drafted them."8
This is as plain a statement as one would wish that the Court
may be prepared to treat "unspoken assumptions" of dead genera-
tions-somehow judicially intuited in the absence of direct sociologi-
cal data-as entitled to as much weight as the language of treaties
and statutes." This approach may be contrasted with that of Justice
Marshall in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission: "The
Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides
a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it pro-
vides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal
statutes must be read."1 1 In 1973, common law principles formed a
"backdrop" for reading statutes. In 1978, statutes apparently pro-
vided the "backdrop" for formulating common law principles.
4. Argumentum ad hominem
One cannot pass over Justice Rehnquist's use of history without
considering an interesting exercise in hero worship. In concluding
that "lower federal courts" historically shared the presumption "that
98. Id. at 206 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
99. Significantly, in pending Supreme Court action the State of Washington has
cited Oliphant in support of the assertion that the views and beliefs of U.S. treaty
commissioners are adequate by themselves to construe Indian treaties. Brief for Peti-
tioner, Washington v. United States, No. 78-119, cert. granted 99 S.Ct. 277 (1978).
. 100. 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
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Indian tribal courts [are] without jurisdiction to try non-Indians,"' 0'
Justice Rehnquist relied on a single, century-old district court opin-
ion, Ex parte Kenyon."2 The Kenyon case, however, received only a
few lines of text in Justice Rehnquist's opinion.11 The judge who
decided the case, Judge Isaac Parker, on the other hand, received
significantly more discussion.1"
Justice Rehnquist, in his treatment of the legendary "hanging
judge" drew on two mawkishly sentimental books, He Hanged Them
High, published in 1952, and Hell on the Border,. published in
1898-the source for much of the later book."0 These books, however,
hardly qualify as objective and scholarly accounts. The author of Hell
On the Border, for example, called Judge Parker his "loved and ho-
nored friend" and Judge Parker's court the "most famous court the
world has ever known," as well as the "greatest criminal court on
earth.""' Hell on the Border is also replete with a number of interest-
ing moralistic messages. The reader is informed, for example, that a
potential cause of alcoholism is the drinking of sacramental wine in
communion.0 7 These messages, it appears, were written for the in-
struction of youth to "instill correct principles into their hearts."'
Both books, however, contain little reference to the judge's view
of Indians or their views of him. The author of the 1898 volume, for
example, professes great personal sympathy for the Oklahoma tribes,
but only once indicates anything of Judge Parker's opinions in the
matter, quoting from an 1895 grand jury charge in which Judge Par-
ker made a point of emphasizing the enforcement of laws prohibiting
the sale of liquor to Indians.' In He Hanged Them High, moreover,
although the author called Judge Parker "a friend of the Indian" who
"knew how white criminals-and black ones, too-were taking ad-
vantage of them" and "meant to do as much as he could, judicially,
to correct this," 0 the author does not specifically document this
judgment.
The author of He Hanged Them High does, however, point out
that Judge Parker was as quick to hang the slayers of Indians as the
101. 435 U.S. at 203. See text accompanying notes 85, 92 supra.
102. Id. at 199 (citing 14 F. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878).
103. Id. at 199-200.
104. Id. at 200.
105. See H. CRoY, HE HANGED THEM HIGH (1952): S. HARMAN, HELL ON THE
BORDER (1898).
106. See S. HARMAN, supra note 105, at iv, 20, 46, 60.
107. See id. at 8.
108. See id. at 3.
109. See id. at 480-84.
110. See H. CROY, supra note 105, at 4-5.
1979]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
slayers of white men."' The equality of treatment may, of course,
bespeak nothing more than the relish with which Judge Parker ap-
proached his distasteful task. The absence of further evidence to
support the characterization of Judge Parker as "a friend of the In-
dian" is aggravated, moreover, by his biographer's casual use of
phrases such as, "[he] accepted his fate with stoical Indian indiffer-
ence,"" 2 and "[h]is mother was half-Negro, one-quarter white, and
one-quarter Cherokee. It was a strange, wild strain; it brought about
many violent deeds."" 3 One may well wonder how an author who
unabashedly uses such descriptions would define "a friend of the
Indian."
Justice Rehnquist singled out an anecdote in He Hanged Them
High for repetition in Oliphant. When Judge Parker was laid to rest
in 1896, "[tlhe principal chief of the Choctaws, Pleasant Porter,
came forward and placed a wreath of wild flowers on the grave.""
The reader is told this is evidence of "the universal esteem in which
the Indian tribes which were subject to the jurisdiction of his court
held Judge Parker.""' One may ask how an isolated event involving
a single Indian proves something "universal." It is, moreover, tempt-
ing to wonder whether Chief Porter's gesture was one of personal
favor, diplomacy, or of gratitude for the decision to remove Judge
Parker from the bench.
From these scant gleanings, however, Justice Rehnquist drew a
grand conclusion:
There cannot be the slightest doubt that Judge Parker was, by his
own lights and by the lights of the time in which he lived, a judge
who was thoroughly acquainted with and sympathetic to the Indians
and Indian tribes which were subject to the jurisdiction of this court,
as well as familiar with the law which governed them."'
Since the extent of Judge Parker's knowledge of Indian law was not
discussed in either of his biographies, there appears to be no founda-
tion for this comment. Of course, even if one were willing to grant that
Judge Parker was sympathetic to the Indians, one may still question
the legal relevance of Judge Parker's sympathies. What is the rele-
vance of the allegation, supposing it true, that Indians liked him?
Neither of these debatable "facts" tend to prove that Judge Parker
knew what he was talking about when he wrote his opinion in
Kenyon.
111. See id. at 54-89.
112. Id. at 49.
113. Id. at 173.
114. Id. at 222, quoted at 435 U.S. 200 n.10.
115. 435 U.S. at 200 n.10.
116. Id.
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It is obvious that biography has no place in the resolution of
important legal questions. A case must be followed if persuasive and
on point, not because the deciding judge was a nice fellow. At best,
Justice Rehnquist's discussion of Judge Parker is an embarassment.
B. INCONSISTENT REASONING
Oliphant also contains two interesting examples of inconsistent
reasoning. One is fairly easy to detect. In his review of the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968,117 Justice Rehnquist observed that the origi-
nal draft of the bill "extended its guarantees only to 'American Indi-
ans,' rather than to 'any person.' """, The language of the bill was
changed to "any person" so that "all persons who may be subject to
the jurisdiction of tribal governments, whether Indians or non-
Indians," would be included.' But, Justice Rehnquist reasoned:
[T]his change was certainly not intended to give Indian tribes
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Nor can it be read to
"confirm"... that Indian tribes have inherent criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. Instead, the modification merely demonstrates
Congress' desire to extend the Act's guarantees to non-Indians if and
where they come under a tribe's criminal or civil jurisdiction by
either treaty provision or act of Congress. 2 0
Justice Rehnquist did not give any indication where evidence of this
intention may be found among the many volumes of testimony and
reports relating to this bill. A review of the record discloses none."'
Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the Act's terminology is
nevertheless plausible. It would have been reasonable to use the
words "any person" if Congress believed that some tribes, whether by
virtue of statutory grant or reserved original sovereignty, enjoy crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians. By the same token, if Congress
believed that no tribes enjoy criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
117. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at) 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1341 (1976)).
118. 435 U.S. at 195 n.6.
119. Id. (quoting Suscomm. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMM., 89M CONG., 2D SESS.: SUMMARY REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
AMERICAN INDIANS 10 (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter cited as CONSmtrrONAL
RIGHTS]).
120. Id. at 195-96 n.6 (emphasis added).
121. The language quoted by Justice Rehnquist in support of his position is
extracted from a 1966 Committee Print that expressed the quoted phrase parentheti-
cally-discussing a revised version of an early Senate Bill-rather than conclusively.
See CONSTrrTUIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 10 (outlining possible revisions to S.
961, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)). No definitive explanation is thus provided by the
source cited.
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the inclusion of non-Indians within the scope of the Act would have
been pointless.
What is puzzling then, is Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that
Congress entertained an "unspoken assumption," since the years pre-
ceding the Civil War, that no tribes enjoy jurisdiction over non-
Indians' crimes.ln If Congress had clearly, but tacitly, assumed for
more than a century that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, it makes no sense to attribute Congress' action in 1968 to a
belief that at least some tribes do have such authority. Either Con-
gress had not assumed that all tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, or the use of the words "any person" in the Indian Civil
Rights Act bears a meaning other than that which Justice Rehnquist
proposed. Justice Rehnquist cannot have it both ways.
One could, of course, avoid this problem by reasoning that per-
haps Congress had always assumed that tribes lack criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians, but in 1968 included non-Indians in the act
just in case this assumption was in error. This argument is, however,
inconsistent with the finding that Congress never doubted that In-
dian tribes do not enjoy jurisdiction over non-Indians.l m The only
other way out of this inconsistency is to suppose that in 1968, Con-
gress had in mind a few specific tribes that may have been expressly
delegated non-Indian criminal jurisdiction. But Justice Rehnquist
explicitly denied the existence of such cases."'
A second and more striking example of inconsistent reasoning is
found at the conclusion of the opinion. Supporting his legal analysis
with considerations of policy, Justice Rehnquist endorsed the Court's
view in 1883 that it is wrong to extend laws
by argument and inference only,. . .over aliens and strangers; over
the members of a community separated by race [and] tradition,
... from the authority and power which seeks to impose upon them
the restraints of an external and unknown code ... ; which judges
them by a standard made by others and not for them .... It tries
them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the
law of their land, but by ... a different race, according to the law
of a social state of which they have an imperfect conception .... 2
Although this language referred only to the extension of federal crimi-
nal laws to reservation Indians without an express act of Congress,
these considerations, according to Justice Rehnquist, "applied...
to the non-Indian rather than Indian offender, speak equally strongly
122. See 435 U.S. at 203.
123. See id. at 197-99 n.8, 205.
124. See id. at 197-99 n.8.
125. Id. at 210-11 (quoting Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883)).
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against the . . . contention that Indian tribes . . . retain the power
to try non-Indians according to their own customs and procedure.' ' 2
The validity of this analogy depends on a tacit premise that
Indian tribes would try non-Indians according to Indian "customs
and procedure" that are "alien" or "external and unknown" to non-
Indians. The greater the similarity between tribal and state courts,
the weaker the analogy. It should be noted, therefore, that Justice
Rehnquist used this argument without introducing facts to substanti-
ate his generalization about tribal law.2' Indeed, Justice Rehnquist
himself stated:
126. Id. at 211.
127. The Supreme Court, however, may have been moved by the unsympathetic
facts in Oliphant. The Port Madison reservation is small, checker-boarded with non-
Indian lands and homes. See id. at 193 n.1. Nearly all of its resident population (98%)
is non-Indian, and although the Tribal Code has recently been amended to extend its
prohibitions to all persons regardless of race, non-Indians were excluded de jure from
Suquamish juries. See id at 194 n.4.
These circumstances render the Court's decision somewhat more understandable
from a visceral perspective. It should be remembered, however, that the facts in
Oliphant were exceptional. Most Indian tribal members have their homes on reserva-
tions at least 20 times the size of Port Madison, and where non-Indians represent a
minority of the resident population. For example, the average trust acreage for the 21
major tribes, as indicated by BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1F
SuBJEcr REPORTS: AMERICA INDIANS 188-89 (1973), is 1,734,000 acres per reservation.
See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND INDIAN
TRUST AREAS (1974) (setting forth statistics for all reservations and trust areas). The
smallest of these major reservations, in fact, encompasses 69,300 trust acres. Id. at 191
(Coeur d'Alene). This compares with Port Madison's 2,680 acres. Id. at 554. Moreover,
on none of the major reservations does non-Indian land comprise more than one-half
of the total reservation area, and on only two (Flathead and Fort Peck) does it appear
that white residents outnumber tribal members. Id. at 274, 279.
Furthermore, exclusion of non-Indians from tribal juries does not appear to be
typical. In any event, the exclusion of non-Indians from Suquamish juries is properly
a separate issue, which was not directly challenged on constitutional grounds, or under
the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1976), by the defendant in
Oliphant. If a tribe, in the exercise of lawful jurisdiction, denies individuals due pro-
cess or equal protection, such a denial of constitutional rights raises a question about
the use of the jurisdiction, not its existence.
In spite of the distinction between the exercise and use of jurisdiction, however,
there is some evidence that the opponents of tribal jurisdiction perceived the Oliphant
case as providing the ideal vehicle in which to attack the exercise of tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indian criminal defendants. South Dakota Attorney General (now Governor)
William Janklow, for example, has been cited as stating that "South Dakota officials
prepared the briefs and other legal material [in Oliphant] which cost the state about
$20,000." Indian Jurisdiction Case Prepared by South Dakotans, Rapid City Journal,
Mar. 9, 1978, at 2, col. 1. Janklow further stated that Oliphant "was a test case from
the state of Washington but it was basically funded by the state of South Dakota ...
It was really our lawsuit." Id. Janklow added, finally, that 11 other states participated
in the Oliphant case. Id.
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We recognize that some Indian tribal court systems have become
increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many respects their state
counterparts. We also acknowledge that with the passage of the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which extends certain basic proce-
dural rights to anyone tried in Indian tribal court, many of the
dangers that might have accompanied the exercise by tribal courts
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians only a few decades ago
have disappeared.la
Justice Rehnquist, however, dismissed these matters as having "little
relevance" to the decision.' 2'
It is also instructive to consider the "slippery slope" of Justice
Rehnquist's paradigm. How alien must institutions be to warrant the
presumption against their extension? One may also speculate as to
how Judge Rehnquist would respond to some of the logical implica-
tions of his reasoning. If tribes cannot prosecute non-Indians on reser-
vations because Indian law is alien to whites, then it would follow
that state courts cannot try tribal Indians off-reservation. The same
policy, and the same assumption of dissimilar institutions, supports
both conclusions. Is it not clear, moreover, that the differences among
the states are always smaller than the differences between states and
tribes.
The failure to consider the ramifications of an argument appears
elsewhere in the closing pages of Oliphant as well. The Marshall
Court regarded tribes as implicitly subject to the superior sovereignty
of the United States to the extent that "any attempt [by foreign
nations] to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion [sic]
with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory,
and an act of hostility.""'3 From this, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
[p]rotection of territory within its external political boundaries is,
of course, central to the sovereign interests of the ... nation. But
from the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, the United States has manifested an equally great solicitude
that its citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted
intrusions on their personal liberty. The power of the United States
to try and criminally punish is an important manifestation of the
power to restrict personal liberty. By submitting to the overriding
128. 435 U.S. at 211-12 (emphasis in original).
129. Id. at 212.
130. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831). Justice
Rehnquist also quoted from Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 593-94
(1823), and Justice Johnson's concurring opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 147 (1810), in which Justice Johnson reasoned that tribes' jurisdiction
extends only to "themselves." In M'Intosh, however, the Court described non-Indian
settlers in tribal territory as subject to tribal property laws. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 593-
94.
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sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily
give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States
except in a manner acceptable to Congress.'
This paragraph is the heart of Oliphant's new rule of tribal powers,
the rule of loss by implication. It is also replete with logical errors.
Judge Rehnquist's argument that the country's fundamental histori-
cal policy of protecting "its citizens. . . from unwarranted intrusions
on their personal liberty" mandates Congressional regulation of the
trial and punishment of non-Indians by tribes, ignores the fact that
the Indian Civil Rights Act 3 ' was Congress' way of guaranteeing the
rights of defendants-Indian and non-Indian alike-in tribal
courts.ln That is the manner "acceptable to Congress," at least since
1968. Furthermore, according to Justice Rehnquist, the national pol-
icy he described applies to "citizens," a class certainly including
tribal Indians. Yet, Justice Rehnquist seemed to assume that the
protection of citizens' liberty only required that whites be immunized
from the risk of tribal prosecution. Can it be that abuses of personal
liberty in tribal court are only directed at non-Indians? Or has Justice
Rehnquist told us that Congress only cares what happens to white
people?
Justice Rehnquist's argument proves nothing more than that
tribal courts are as vulnerable to federal regulation of procedural
fairness as are the courts of the states. He has shown why tribes
should not be free of express federal regulation of their courts, but not
why, in the absence of any explicit federal legislation, this regulation
bars the prosecution of non-Indians.
Clearly, the justification for distinguishing between states and
Indian tribes, in a matter as sensitive as criminal jurisdiction, must
have some firm foundation, if not in statutory law, at least in public
policy. Justice Rehnquist, however, appeared to find justification
enough in insulating the nation's non-Indian citizens from the abuses
he assumed peculiar to tribal law. He thus appeared to endorse In re
Mayfield's century-old theory of allowing tribes only "such power of
self-government as [is] thought to be consistent with the safety of
the white population.""' In effect, Justice Rehnquist's policy argu-
ment in support of Oliphant discriminates against Indians because
of their ethnicity and customs.
131. 435 U.s. at 210 (emphasis added).
132. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1976).
133. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
134. 141 U.S. 107, 115 (1891), quoted at 435 U.S. at 204.
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE BETRAYAL
Oliphant is a betrayal of tribes that have struggled to Westernize
their legal systems. Since Congress gave its blessing to Western-style
constitutional tribal government in 1934,135 tribes have largely aban-
doned traditional procedures, persuaded that adaption and
"modernization" of their courts would enhance their legitimacy in
non-Indian eyes, and hence reduce their vulnerability to federal and
state interference.' 6 Congress encouraged and subsidized this trans-
formation by means of the Indian Civil Rights Act and its model
tribal criminal codes, special grant and technical assistance programs
within the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Law Enforcement Assis-
tance Administration, and support of various Indian Law Institutes
and organizations such as the National American Indian Tribal Court
Judges Association." 7 The tribes, in turn, have been rewarded for
their efforts with a Supreme Court decision that has stripped them
of a sizeable share of their jurisdiction.
The Court has also acted to deprive tribal governments of the
only power they have to protect themselves: orderly tribal legal pro-
cess. Although Justice Rehnquist assured his readers that the Court
was "not unaware of the prevalence of non-Indian crime on today's
reservations," he concluded that this had "little relevance.""'3 It ap-
pears, on the other hand, that the implication of Oliphant for reserva-
tion law enforcement will be substantial. Many reservation commun-
ities are remote from state law enforcement facilities. On reservations
where state authorities were responsible for law enforcement before
Oliphant, there were complaints of slow response or no response to
problems. '39 After Oliphant, both state and tribal police officers may
be reluctant to proceed when the race of the suspect is uncertain. For
many reservations, therefore, Oliphant may create a practical juris-
dictional vacuum. Thus, although reservation non-Indians may see
Oliphant as a victory, it is in real terms a defeat. They, along with
135. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
136. See generally Barsh & Henderson, supra note 10. In some instances, in the
authors' experience, tribes have been encouraged to adopt institutions that are con-
servative even in current American practice.
137. See generally DIVISION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SER ICES, BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, INDIAN LAw ENFORCEMENT HISTORY (1975); NATIONAL AMEmRcAN INDIAN COURT
JUDGES ASSOCIATION, CRamNAL Cour PROCEDURES MANuAL (1971); Barsh & Henderson,
supra note 10, at 49-56; Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 "Indian Civil
Rights" Act, 9 HARv. J. LEGIS. 557 (1972).
138. 435 U.S. at 212.
139. See NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN COURT JUDGEs ASSOCIATION, 1 JUSTICE AND
TH AMERICAN INDIAN 4-8 (1972); AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY Rrvmw ComMISSION, 1 FINAL
REPORT 204 (Comm. Print 1977).
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reservation Indians, are now less protected from injury to their lives
and property.
There is, in addition, a serious danger that Oliphant will be
applied to civil matters. Although Oliphant dealt only with criminal
jurisdiction, its rationale is broad enough to include all tribal juris-
diction over non-Indians. A federal district court in Seattle has al-
ready held that tribes lack the power to enforce building, zoning, and
land use ordinances against non-Indian-owner firms."' If this decision
is upheld, neither the states nor tribes will be able to implement
environmental, health, or safety legislation on reservations. Ob-
viously, to be effective, all forms of resource-use regulation must be
geographically consistent. Ordinarily the only breakdown in such reg-
ulatory schemes occurs at territorial borders, as in the case of air or
water pollution "spilling over" a state boundary. Resource-use regu-
lation, however, becomes meaningless when boundaries occur at the
end of each street or town lot, depending on the race of the proprietor
or shareholders. Oliphant may, therefore, be used to prevent tribes
from maintaining a standard of regulation greater than that which a
state might enforce.
The ultimate danger of Oliphant is, however, to the entire judi-
cial system. A judicial system cannot long maintain its authority
when its written opinions appear insincere, or the product of distor-
tion, unreason, or sloppiness. One may well reject our criticisms of
the holding in Oliphant, even with our disapproval of the practice of
submitting social issues of such magnitude to judicial, as opposed to
legislative, judgment. We do not necessarily expect others to share
our conclusions as to good social policy in the case of tribes. Poor
judicial craftsmanship is, however, a matter that affects our society
and the legal profession as a whole, to the detriment of all.
140. See Trans-Canada Enterprises Ltd. v. Muckeshoot Indian Tribe, Civil No.
C77-882M (W.D. Wash. July 27, 1978) (order).
19791
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Appendix
Applicable Law for Crimes on Indian Lands
We have characterized the judicial pursuit of principles in Indian
law as akin to Lewis Carroll's hunting of the snark. Much of the
blame for the judiciary's "aimless voyage," may be laid at the appar-
ent lack of familiarity possessed by courts, of the applicable law for
crimes committed on Indian land. The result of this lack of familiar-
ity has recently been an inexorable loss of self-governing authority for
Indians, as courts have continued to extend federal law onto Indian
lands.
The following materials present in tabular form the treaty law
applicable to criminal trials for various violations on Indian land. The
information presented in these tables was compiled by the authors
from Charles Kappler's 1904 compendium of Indian treaties.' Table
one analyzes treaty provisions for Indians' crimes against non-
Indians, and table two sets forth treaty provisions for non-Indians'
crimes against Indians.
1. C. KAPPLxR, 2 INDi. Ai'Ais: LAW AND TArTms (1904). The compilation was
printed for use by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, and brings together in a
single volume treaties dispersed through twenty volumes of Statutes at Large.
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